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slots bonus Ruben Amorim says Manchester United are a massive club but not a massive team as he continues to try and turn around a group that need to “run like mad dogs” if they are to become winners. A poor start to Erik ten Hag’s third season in charge last month led the Red Devils to turn to the 39-year-old, who immediately lifted the mood after swapping Sporting for Old Trafford. Amorim followed a draw at Ipswich in his opening match with entertaining wins against Bodo/Glimt and Everton, yet he repeatedly attempted to manage expectations. The Portuguese said United would “suffer for a long period” and then warned a “storm will come” ahead of Wednesday’s 2-0 loss at Arsenal – a reality check before hosting Nottingham Forest on Saturday. “I think that is very clear,” Amorim said of the scale of the job. “We are a massive club, but we are not a massive team, and we know it. It’s no problem to say it. “So, we want to improve, we are in a different moment from Arsenal, but you could feel it during the game. “I think we have to believe more because we were not dominant in the game, but we had control in the game. “Not so many chances for Arsenal – of course a lot of set pieces – but we were OK, especially in the first half. We had some good things in that moment, but you could feel that there’s so much to do. “We need to be better in the final third, we have to create more danger, they have to feel it. “I felt that Arsenal had problems to block our build up but then when they were defending the goal it was quite comfortable for them, so we are learning these things and trying to improve in two days.” United’s problems mean they enter the weekend 13th in the Premier League standings – quite the sight for fans of a club who have won an English record 20 league titles. Asked if perceptions around the club need to change, Amorim said: “That will not change because this club has glories in the past. “Our players have to understand that this is a very difficult position, so we are not (one of) the best teams in the league, and we have to say that and to think that clearly. “But our past, our club is maybe the best one in the league, so we have here a problem, but we have to focus on the little things, the little details. “If you think in everything, it will be a problem. Let’s focus on the small details and then we will improve it as a team.” Amorim has had precious little time to work on such details having started during an international break followed by a relentless winter schedule. Saturday’s home game against Forest is United’s third of nine matches in December and came with a demand for effort on top of technical quality. “It’s impossible to win the Premier League without a team like that – that every moment runs back, runs forward,” Amorim said. “It is impossible to win. If you want to win, we have to do it. “Even with the best starting XI in the planet without running they will not win nothing, so that is very clear. “If we want to win the Premier League, we have to run like mad dogs. If not, we are not going to win.” Interestingly, Amorim’s comments come six years after compatriot Jose Mourinho spoke about United’s lack of “mad dogs” following a December draw at Southampton. “It doesn’t matter about the system,” the former United manager said. “It has to do with the characteristics of the players and we don’t have many, with all the respect, mad dogs – the ones who bite the ball all the time and press all the time. We don’t have many with that spirit.” Amorim will hope not to be feeling similar after facing Forest, having previously said he needs to improve the “physical aspect of the team”. “The problem to be fit enough is if they can cope with that,” United’s head coach said. “If they are used to do that in training, they will do that in games. “So, they are professional athletes, they can improve this. You cannot be faster, but you can run more with training. We are in that path.”

Discover the JOC (Japan Open Chain) Listing on XTDwyane Wade (via: timesofindia.indiatimes.com) Just when we thought Dwyane Wade and his family were living their best holiday moments, a twist has left fans puzzled. Yesterday, we were all smiles as we watched Dwyane, Gabrielle Union, and their adorable daughter Kaavia soaking up the holiday magic. Today, however, the mood has shifted, and there’s a mystery in the air, someone in the Wade family isn’t feeling their best. Naturally, fans are now wondering: who could it be? Who's under the weather in Wade family? Dwyane Wade’s Candid Talk About Supporting His 12-Year-Old's Gender Identity What a sudden change! Just yesterday, Dwyane Wade had us all smiling with heartwarming beach moments, hanging out with his wife Gabrielle Union and their adorable daughter Kaavia. But today, the holiday mood has shifted, and there’s a bit of a mystery. Someone in the Wade family isn’t feeling well, and fans are eager to know who could it be? In his latest Instagram post, Wade shared a shopping list that caught everyone’s attention: “Froot Loops,” “Apple Jacks,” “Cinnamon Toast Crunch,” and “Vicks Vapor Rub”? Wait, what? Fans were left scratching their heads. Why would vapor rub be on a snack list? The confusion hung in the air until Wade gave us a little more insight. (via: EssentiallySports) In his next post, Dwyane, clearly playing the role of devoted dad, shared a picture from the grocery store, with a cart full of snacks. But it was the caption that gave it away: “A sick baby and snacks.” That cleared things up. Someone in the family was under the weather. But who? While we don’t know for sure, Wade’s words seem to suggest that little Kaavia might be the one feeling unwell. Thankfully, it doesn’t seem too serious, especially with Dwyane there to take care of her. After all, when Dad’s around, everything’s bound to be okay, right? Also Read: Jeanine Robel, Anthony Edwards' girlfriend, reacts in two words after watching T'Wolves-Mavs game with kids How Wade and his family landed in North Fork Earlier this year, Dwyane Wade and his wife, Gabrielle Union, made waves with the purchase of a stunning beach house in Jamesport, a picturesque town on Long Island’s North Fork. The luxurious retreat, which cost them a cool $2.6 million, quickly became their go-to escape for family relaxation. The LA-based power couple, along with their adorable 6-year-old daughter, Kaavia, have been spotted soaking in the peaceful vibes of their new haven, making it the perfect spot for downtime. As the holiday season rolled in, Dwyane gave fans a peek into their Christmas getaway, sharing that they’d headed to their North Fork home to celebrate. Judging by their social media, it’s clear the family was living their best life, fully immersed in the holiday spirit. However, with flu season at its peak in December and January, there’s a chance Kaavia caught the seasonal bug. If Shady Baby has indeed caught a cold, she’s in great hands. With Dwyane’s fighting spirit in her DNA, there’s no doubt she’ll recover quickly, proving once again that resilience runs deep in this family. In his latest post, Dwyane shared a heartwarming image of the road leading to their beach house, beautifully adorned with Christmas lights, including ones shaped like festive trees. The festive display reassures fans that everything’s fine. Just like his legendary career on the court, Dwyane is in control, and there’s nothing to worry about.Perdue as Beijing envoy will boost US-China investor confidence

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After the apparent benefits to Israel of Syria’s government collapse, the best time to ensure “escalation dominance” and a non-nuclear Iran will still be while its recalcitrant enemy in Tehran is still pre-nuclear. Though Israel’s capacity for missile defense against Iran has already been demonstrated by Jerusalem, even the best active defenses could never offer Israel a reliably long-term survival substitute for apt strategies of offense. Finally because Iran maintains close security ties with an already-nuclear North Korea, Israel will have to consider that non-Islamist adversary in its “post-Syria” calculations and calibrations. Of related importance, Israel will need to determine how the fall of Russia’s surrogate in Damascus will impact Moscow’s continued support of Tehran. After the Syrian collapse, Israel’s nuclear strategy will remain relevant to Iranian non-nuclear threats. Determining variously precise levels of strategic relevance, however, would be difficult in periods of active warfare. During such bewildering periods, Israeli determinations would depend significantly on “soft” explanatory factors such as Iranian leadership rationality and the anticipated destructiveness of Iran-inflicted non-nuclear harms. Moreover, this critical dependence would apply to Iranian first-strike attacks, retaliatory attacks and counter-retaliatory attacks. Variously intersecting issues will need to be considered in Jerusalem. It would be capricious to argue that Israel’s nuclear deterrence posture should necessarily parallel prospective Iranian destructiveness (closely or partially) or that Iranian non-nuclear threats (whether singly by Iran, Iran-based interstate alliances (including North Korea) or Iran-terror-group “hybrids” should be symmetrically countered. Only one thing is certain: appearances will be unreliable predictors. At first glance, a “symmetry hypothesis” could seem to make perfect sense. But strategic truth is excruciatingly complex and could quickly or incrementally prove indecipherable. Because virtually all Israel-related nuclear scenarios would be (i.e., without determinable precedent), nothing of any scientific value could be extrapolated. Concerning Israeli nuclear decision-makers’ usable probabilities, all they could reasonably be asked to accept would be competing iterations of subjective belief. Israel’s core strategies will still need to be informed by refined philosophies of science. In this primary obligation, meaningful assessments of hypotheses concerning “asymmetrical nuclear deterrence” and Israeli national security will need to be founded on formal deductive examinations This unchallengeable imperative indicates that Israeli intelligence assessments devoid of verifiable empirical content could still be usefully predictive. Even in the midst of future war with Iran, these assessments should be supportable by immutably basic standards of logic-based assessment: internal consistency, thematic interconnectedness and dialectical reasoning. A good place for Israeli strategists to accelerate time-urgent investigations would be within the “grey area” of Iranian non-nuclear threats that are unconventional. Most obvious would be credible enemy threats of biological warfare, biological terrorism and/or electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attacks. While non-nuclear by definition, biological warfare attacks could produce grievously injurious or near-existential event outcomes for Israel. Apart from science-based expectations of significant human harms, biological warfare attacks would likely have material impact on public fears and national decisions. Similar impacts could be expected from different scenarios involving EMP ordnance. Israeli policies of calibrated nuclear reprisal for biological warfare (BW) attacks could exhibit compelling deterrent effectiveness against certain limited types of adversary. Such policies would be inapplicable against any threats issuing from terror groups that function alone, i.e., without recognizable state alignments. In such residual cases, Israel, lacking any operational targets more suitable for nuclear targeting, would need to “fall back” on the more usual arsenals of counter-terrorist methods. In the future, such a tactical retrogression would be required even if the particular terror group involved had revealed believable nuclear threat capabilities. Because such terrorists could identify personal death as a sanctifying expression of religious martyrdom Israeli planners might have to draw upon continuously mutating psychological assessments. What about Iranian conventional threats that would involve neither nuclear nor biological hazards, but be massive enough to produce near-existential harms? As a conventional aggressor, Iran could reasonably calculate that Jerusalem would make good on some identifiable portion of its nuclear threats. Here, however, Israel’s nuclear deterrent threat credibility would be dependent on variously antecedent or coinciding shifts from “deliberate nuclear ambiguity” (the so-called “bomb in the basement”) to “selective nuclear disclosure.” Additional nuances will require correlative Israeli decisions. As a direct consequence of diminished nuclear ambiguity, Jerusalem should signal its Iranian adversary that Israel would wittingly cross the nuclear retaliatory threshold to prevent any acts of existential or near-existential aggression. Using more expressly military parlance, Israel’s immediate shift to apt forms of selective nuclear disclosure should seek to ensure the Jewish State’s success in expected struggles for “escalation dominance.” In part, the nuclear deterrence advantages for Israel of moving from deliberate nuclear ambiguity to selective nuclear disclosure would lie in the signal it could “telegraph” to a still non-nuclear Iran. Such a signal would warn this adversary that Jerusalem was not limited to launching retaliations that employ massive and/or disproportionate levels of nuclear force. A still-timely Israeli move from nuclear ambiguity to nuclear disclosure could improve Israel’s prospects for deterring large-scale conventional attacks with “tailored” nuclear threats. After Syria’s collapse, a not-yet-nuclear Iran might more reasonably fear certain new Israel-Sunni Arab alignments. Israeli nuclear deterrence benefits against non-nuclear threats could extend to threats of nuclear counter-retaliation. If, for example, Israel initiates the next and more protracted cycle of war with Iran – a survival-based initiative that could represent “anticipatory self-defense” under Westphalian international law – the likelihood of suffering any massive Iranian conventional retaliation might be diminished. In essence, by moving immediately from deliberate nuclear ambiguity to selective nuclear disclosure, Jerusalem could upgrade its overall deterrence posture vis-à-vis Iran. In protecting itself from deliberate nuclear attack, Israeli strategists should accept certain core assumptions of Iranian enemy rationality. But even if these assumptions were well-founded, there would remain variously attendant dangers of unintentional or inadvertent nuclear war. These potentially existential dangers could be produced by enemy hacking operations, computer malfunction (an accidental nuclear war) or decision-making miscalculation (whether by Iran, by Israel, or by both/all parties.) In the portentous third scenario, damaging synergies could arise that would prove extremely difficult or even impossible to halt. To an unforeseeable extent, the geo-strategic search for “escalation dominance” by all sides to a potentially nuclear conflict would enlarge the risks of an inadvertent nuclear war. These risks would include prospects of a nuclear war by accident and/or decisional miscalculation. The “solution” here could not be to simply wish-away the common search for “escalation dominance” (any such wish would be contrary to the “logic” of balance-of-power world politics), but to manage all prospectively nuclear crises at their lowest possible levels of destructiveness. Wherever feasible, it would be best to avoid such crises altogether, and to maintain in place reliable “circuit breakers” against strategic hacking or technical malfunction. In the expanding cauldron of Middle Eastern chaos, Israel will need to assess and re-assess its ties to certain Sunni Arab states. Among other things, Israeli nuclear strategists should competently re-assess the Trump-era “Abraham Accords:” Have these agreements given Israel any greater cause for security confidence, or do they enhance “peace” only where there have never been actual adversaries? And have the Abraham Accords hardened the Middle East Sunni-Shia dualism, thereby rendering Iran and its terror-surrogates an even greater threat to Israel? Though Israel has no regional nuclear adversaries at present, the steady approach of a nuclear Iran could encourage rapid nuclearization among such Sunni Arab states as Saudi Arabia, Egypt or United Arab Emirates (UAE). Following the turnover of Afghanistan to Taliban and other Islamist forces, the strengthening of al-Qaeda and ISIS offshoots in post-Assad Syria and the Pakistan cultivation of improved relations with Iran, non-Arab Pakistan could more likely become a direct adversary of Israel. Pakistan is an already nuclear Islamic state with substantial ties to China and Saudi Arabia. Pakistan, like Israel, is not a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty or NPT. During any war with Iran, Jerusalem would need to “keep an eye” on Islamabad. “Everything is very simple in war,” says Carl von Clausewitz in “but the simplest thing is very difficult.” Longer term, salient issues of Israeli nuclear deterrence against non-nuclear threats could be impacted by Palestinian statehood To wit, while rarely mentioned in the same breath as nuclear war, the creation of Palestine could meaningfully affect Israel’s war preparations against a still non-nuclear Iran. , if Israel’s war against Iran were fought or continued after that enemy state became nuclear, the presence of a Palestinian state could negatively affect the correlation of military forces in the region. For the moment, a Palestinian state is generally “off the radar.” Nonetheless, it is reasonable to argue that once Palestine came into formal or existence as a sovereign state, any prior shift in Israel’s nuclear strategy from to would reduce Israel’s Jerusalem’s incentive to war against Iran. This expectation could make strategic sense only if Israel were first willing to believe that its nuclear deterrent threat, as a determinable consequence of this shift, was being taken with greater seriousness by Iran. Several corollary problems will soon need to be considered. First, how would Israel’s leadership actually that taking its bomb out of the “basement” had improved its nuclear deterrence posture regarding Iran? To an unpredictable extent, the credibility of Jerusalem’s nuclear threats would be contingent upon the variable severity of different provocations. It might prove believable if Israel were to threaten nuclear reprisals for provocations that endanger the physical survival of the state, but it would almost certainly be unbelievable to threaten such reprisals for relatively minor territorial infringements or almost any level of terrorist attack. Whatever analysts might conclude on such questions, because there exists no discoverable frequency of pertinent past events, judgments of probability Israel’s planners could represent only what Oswald Spengler famously called “glorified belief” in . There are other problems. To function successfully, Israel’s nuclear deterrent, even after conspicuous removal from the “basement,” would have to appear secure from Iranian preemptive strikes. Accordingly, Israel would need to be especially wary of “decapitation,” of losing the “head” of its military command and control system as a result of Iranian strikes. If Iran should remain unpersuaded by Jerusalem’s sudden shift away from deliberate nuclear ambiguity, it could initiate non-nuclear strikes that weaken or eviscerate Israel’s These strikes could include use of radiation dispersal weapons or electromagnetic pulse weapons (EMP). Also to be taken seriously by Jerusalem would be an Iranian and/or surrogate conventional missile attack on Israel’s nuclear reactor at In weighing different arguments concerning the effect of Palestine upon Israeli nuclear deterrence, specific attention should be directed toward (1) Israel’s presumptions about the imminence and longevity of unconventional war; and (2) Israel’s long-term expectations regarding Iranian strategic vulnerability. Should Israel’s leaders conclude that the creation of Palestine would make an imminent unconventional war more destructive and that Iranian vulnerability to Israeli strikes would diminish, Jerusalem’s inclination to strike massively against Iran could be increased. To a still-indecipherable extent, Israel’s tactical/operational judgments on striking first would be affected by antecedent decisions on nuclear strategy. these critical decisions would concern “counter value” vs. “counterforce” targeting issues. If Israel should opt for nuclear deterrence based on an “assured destruction” (“counter value”) strategy, Jerusalem would likely choose a relatively small number of weapons that might be relatively inaccurate. A “counterforce” strategy, on the other hand, would require a larger number of more accurate weapons, ordnance that could destroy even the most hardened enemy targets. To an extent, “going for counterforce” could render Israeli nuclear threats more credible. This conclusion would be based largely on the assumption that because the effects of war-fighting nuclear weapons would be more precise and controlled, they would also be more amenable to actual use. Already, this precise calculation animates Pakistan’s strategy vis-à-vis India. Other things being equal, openly war-fighting postures of Israeli nuclear deterrence would more likely encourage Israeli defensive strikes. If counterforce targeted nuclear weapons were ever fired, especially in a proliferated regional setting, the resultant escalation could produce extensive counter value nuclear exchanges. Even if such escalations were averted, the “collateral” effects of counterforce detonations could prove devastating. In making its nuclear choices, Israel will have to confront a paradox. Credible nuclear deterrence, essential to Israeli security and survival in a world made more dangerous by the creation of Palestine, would require “usable” nuclear weapons. If, after all, these weapons were patently inappropriate for any reasonable objective, they would not deter. At the same time, the more usable such nuclear weapons become in order to enhance nuclear deterrence, the more likely it is, at one time or another, they will actually be fired. While this paradox would seem to suggest the rationality of Israel deploying only the least-harmful forms of usable nuclear weapons, the fact that there could be no reliably coordinated agreements with Iran on deployable nuclear weapons points to a markedly different conclusion. Unless Israel were to calculate that more harmful weapons would produce greater hazards for its own population as well as for target populations, there would exist no tactical benefit to opting for the least injurious nuclear weapons. For the moment, at least, it appears that Israel has rejected any nuclear warfighting strategies of deterrence in favor of a still-implicit counter-value engagement posture. But this could change in response to the pace and direction of any ongoing Israel-Iran war and of Iranian nuclearization. In view of what is now generally recognized, there is every good reason to assume that Israel’s nuclear arsenal does exist and that Israel’s assorted enemies share this critical assumption. The most critical question about Israel’s nuclear deterrent, however, is not about , but . How likely is it that Israel, after launching non-nuclear strikes against Iranian hard targets would respond to enemy reprisals with a nuclear counter-retaliation? To answer this core question, Israel’s decision-makers will first have to put themselves into the shoes of pertinent Iranian leaders. Will these leaders calculate that they can afford to retaliate massively against Israel, i.e., that such retaliation would not produce a nuclear counter-retaliation? In asking this question, they will assume, of course, a non-nuclear retaliation against Israel. Depending upon the way in which the enemy decision-makers interpret Israel’s authoritative perceptions, they will accept or reject the cost-effectiveness of a non-nuclear retaliation against Israel. This means that it is likely in Israel’s best interests to communicate the following strategic assumption to all its existential enemies: . The plausibility of this assumption would be enhanced if enemy reprisals were to involve chemical, biological or EMP weapons. All such “glorified belief” calculations assume enemy rationality. In the absence of calculations that compare the costs and benefits of all strategic alternatives, what will happen in the imminent Israel-Iran must remain a matter of conjecture. The prospect of non-rational judgments in such a conflict is always plausible, especially as the influence of Islamist/ ideology could remain determinative among Iranian decisional elites. Still, various dangers of a nuclear war will obtain even among fully rational adversaries. This includes both deliberate nuclear war and inadvertent unclear war. Israel’s nuclear deterrent should always remain oriented toward dominating escalation at multiple and intersecting levels of conventional and unconventional enemy threats. For this to work, Israeli strategic planners should continuously bear in mind that intra-war operational success will depend on prior formulations of suitable national doctrine or strategic theory. In the end, the truest forms of Israeli power will have to reflect “a triumph of mind over mind,” not just of “mind over matter.” The most persuasive forms of military power on planet earth are not guns, battleships or missiles. Rather, they are believable promises of “life everlasting” or personal immortality When one finally uncovers what is most utterly important to the vast majority of human beings, this factor is a presumptive Lamentably, individuals all over the world too often regard the corrosive dynamics of belligerent nationalism as a preferred path to personal immortality. Why else, in essentially all global conflict ( national and -national) would each side seek so desperately align with God? Always, the loudest nationalistic claim is manipulatively reassuring: “Fear not,” the citizens and subjects are counseled, “God is on our side.” In our present analytic context, what promise could possibly prove more heartening to Israel’s enemies and more fearsome to Israel? Ultimately, Israel’s most compelling forms of strategic influence will derive not from high technology weaponry, but from the evident advantages of intellectual power. These always-overriding advantages must be explored and compared according to two very specific but overlapping criteria of assessment: law and strategy. In certain circumstances, these complex expectations might not be congruent or “in synch” with each other, but contradictory. Here, the underlying “mind over mind” challenges to Israel would become excruciatingly difficult; nonetheless, successful decision-making outcomes could still be kept in plain sight and remain sufficiently credible. What will be required will be a suitably theoretical appreciation of decisional complexity and a corresponding willingness to approach all relevant issues from convergent standpoints of science, intellect and dialectical analysis. In principle, at least, cumulative policy failures could produce broadly existential outcomes. Acknowledging this, Israel’s policy planners and decision–makers should strive to ensure that the beleaguered country’s nuclear deterrent could protect against large-scale non-nuclear attacks. A first step in reaching this assurance should be the systematic application of formal decision-theory to the “Iran problem,” a deductive task that would (1) not depend on historical precedent or data; and (2) give informed support to Israeli leadership decisions on nuclear deterrence and “escalation dominance.” For Israel, the primary battlefield with Iran should always be viewed as an intellectual rather than territorial arena. Despite recurrent threats of annihilation, Israel has never issued any expressly nuclear threats to Iran or its proxies. But present times are more strategically uncertain than ever before, and Israel’s optimal path to managing a catastrophic war with Iran should be to keep that threat non-nuclear. It follows that Jerusalem should prepare to use graduated nuclear threats against Iran . Among other things, this raises the prospect of a “limited nuclear war.” Immediately, to best ensure that Israeli paths to escalation dominance remain “navigable,” Jerusalem will need to implement far-reaching shifts from “deliberate nuclear ambiguity” to “selective nuclear disclosure.” For the moment, there would appear to be no more promising way to protect the Jewish State from an unconventional and eventually nuclear war with Iran. Such implementation could also serve Israel’s security needs vis-à-vis a nuclear North Korea functioning as Iranian military proxy, and prospectively-nuclear Sunni Arab states such as Egypt or Saudi Arabia. Though the rationale for Sunni state nuclearization would be national self-defense from a nearly-nuclear Shiite state adversary in Tehran, this does not mean that these Arab states would become “friends of Israel.” Instead, it could signal the beginnings of a worst-case scenario in which the still-beleaguered Jewish State would face similarly recalcitrant nuclear foes. Summing up all pertinent arguments, there is nothing about the recent collapse of Syria’s al-Assad regime that should diminish Israel’s protection efforts against a still-nuclearizing Iran. Quite the contrary. The author’s first comprehensive examination of this issue was: Louis René Beres, (1986). But see also more recent: Louis René Beres, (2016; 2 ed., 2018). Expressions of enemy irrationality could take different or overlapping forms. These include a disorderly or inconsistent value system; computational errors in calculation; an incapacity to communicate efficiently; random or haphazard influences in the making or transmittal of particular decisions; and the internal dissonance generated by any structure of collective decision-making (i.e., assemblies of pertinent individuals who lack identical value systems and/or whose organizational arrangements impact their willing capacity to act as a single or unitary national decision maker). See authoritative at BESA (Israel). Says Carl on Clausewitz: “Defensive warfare does not consist of waiting idly for things to happen. We must wait only if it brings us visible and decisive advantages. That calm before the storm, when the aggressor is gathering new forces for a great blow, is most dangerous for the defender.” (See 1812). A similarly timeless argument was made much earlier by ancient Chinese military thinker Sun-Tzu in “Those who excel at defense bury themselves away below the lowest depths of Earth. Those who excel at offense move from above the greatest heights of Heaven. Thus they are able to preserve themselves and attain completer victory.” See also an by this writer, Louis René Beres, at Harvard Law School, . Such calculations would essentially be dialectical. The term “dialectical” originates from Greek expression for the art of conversation. A common contemporary meaning is method of seeking truth by correct reasoning. From the standpoint of shaping Israel’s intra-war deterrence strategy vis-à-vis Iran, the following operations should be regarded as essential but nonexclusive components: (1) a method of refutation conducted by examining logical consequences; (2) a method of division or repeated logical analysis of genera into species; (3) logical reasoning using premises that are probable or generally accepted; (4) formal logic; and (5) the logical development of thought through thesis and antithesis to fruitful synthesis of these opposites. In world politics and law, a state or insurgent-group is determinedly rational to the extent that its leadership always values collective survival more highly than any other conceivable preference or combination of preferences. An insurgent/terrorist force will not always display such a clarifying or “helpful” preference ordering. Pertinent “post-Syria” examples regarding Israel are assorted Sunni jihadists spawned or strengthened by al-Assad’s overthrow. In essence, these coalescing terror groups represent new variants of al-Qaeda and ISIS. See: Anatol Rapoport, (1964). Says Rapoport, in an early observation that now applies usefully to Israel, Iran and nuclear war avoidance: “Formal decision-theory does not depend on data.... The task of theory is confined to the construction of a deductive apparatus, to be used in deriving logically necessary conclusions from given assumptions.” See, for example, by this author: Louis René Beres, “Martyrdom and International Law,” , September 10, 2018; and Louis René Beres, “Religious Extremism and International Legal Norms: Perfidy, Preemption and Irrationality,” Vol. 39, No.3., 2007-2008, pp. 709-730. See by this author, Louis René Beres, at INSS (Tel Aviv). Embedded in attempts to achieve this success would be variously credible threats of “assured destruction.” This term references ability to inflict “unacceptable damage” after absorbing an attacker’s first strike. In the traditional nuclear lexicon, (MAD) would describe a stand-off condition in which an assured destruction capacity is possessed by both (or all) opposing sides. would be those which target only an adversary’s strategic military facilities and supporting infrastructure. Such strategies could be dangerous not only because of the “collateral damage” they might produce, but also because they could heighten the likelihood of first-strike attacks. would refer to harms done to human and non-human resources as a consequence of strategic strikes directed at enemy forces or military facilities. Even such “unintended” damage could quickly involve large numbers of casualties/fatalities. In effect, Israel’s posture of deliberate nuclear ambiguity was already breached by two of the country’s prime ministers, first, by Shimon Peres, on December 22, 1995, and second, by Ehud Olmert, on December 11, 2006. Peres, speaking to a group of Israeli newspaper and magazine editors, then stated publicly: “...give me peace, and we’ll give up the atom. That’s the whole story.” When, later, Olmert offered similarly general but also revelatory remarks, they were described widely (and benignly) as “slips of the tongue.” It’s now a very delicate regional balance of power for Israel to negotiate. For years, a Salafi/Deobandi (Sunni) Crescent has emerged to challenge the Shiite axis. With the fall of al-Assad in Syria, this axis has been weakened, most obviously Iran. At the same time, Iran will still find support in parts of Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon, while Israel will now have to deal with the potentially more problematic Sunni terrorists actively institutionalizing operations in Damascus. This lawful option can be found in customary international law. The most precise origins of in such authoritative law lie in the a case that concerned the unsuccessful rebellion of 1837 in Upper Canada against British rule. Following this case, the serious threat of armed attack has generally justified certain militarily defensive actions. In an exchange of diplomatic notes between the governments of the United States and Great Britain, then U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster outlined a framework for self-defense that did not require an antecedent attack. Here, the jurisprudential framework permitted a military response to a so long as the danger posed was “instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.” See: Beth M. Polebaum, “National Self-defense in International Law: An Emerging Standard for a Nuclear Age,” 59 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 187, 190-91 (1984) (noting that the case had transformed the right of self-defense from an excuse for armed intervention into a legal doctrine). Still earlier, see: Hugo Grotius, 2 168-75 (Carnegie Endowment Trust, 1925) (1625); and Emmerich de Vattel, , 3 Classics of International Law, 130 (Carnegie Endowment Trust, 1916) (1758). Also, Samuel Pufendorf, 32 (Frank Gardner Moore., tr., 1927 (1682). The Peace of Westphalia (1648) concluded the Thirty Years War and created the still-existing state system. See: , Oct. 1648, 1 Consol. T.S. 271; and , Oct. 1648, 1., Consol. T.S. 119. Together, these two treaties comprise the “Peace of Westphalia.” Incontestably, since this Peace put an end to the last of the major religious wars sparked by the Reformation, the “state system” has been ridden with evident strife and recurrent calamity. As a global “state of nature” characterized by interminable “war of all against all” (a the conspicuous legacy of Westphalia has proven disappointing. . The idea of a – an idea of which the nuclear-age is merely a modern variant – has never been more than facile metaphor. Oddly, it has never had anything to do with ascertaining equilibrium. As such, balance is always more-or-less a matter of individual subjective perception. Adversarial states can never be sufficiently confident that identifiable strategic circumstances are actually “balanced” in their favor. In consequence, each side must perpetually fear that it will be left behind, a fear creating ever-wider patterns of world system insecurity and disequilibrium. See the Declaration; Also to be considered as complementary in this connection is the (October 23, 2020) and (December 10, 2020). See David Albright and Sarah Burkhard, “ ,” Institute for Science and International Security (December 10, 2024). In essence, this technical report “sounds an alarm” that there is taking place “a dangerous increase in Iran’s enrichment activities at the Fordow enrichment plant.” In principle, the existential dangers posed by Iran could be more-or-less effectively balanced by a new Sunni Arab nuclear capability in Riyadh, Cairo or Abu Dhabi. In that ironic circumstance, Jerusalem might conclude that certain expressions of selective Arab nuclearization would represent a helpful or even benign development. In the longer term view, however, Jerusalem would be forced to decide which particular adversary or pair of adversaries was potentially more intolerable, and whether or not some form of preemption might sometime be required. Seventeenth-century English philosopher, Thomas Hobbes, instructs that although international relations (the state of nations) is in the state of nature, it is nonetheless more tolerable than the condition of individual men in nature. This is because, with individual human beings, “the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest.” Now, with the advent of nuclear weapons, there is no reason to believe that the state of nations remains more tolerable. Rather, nuclear weapons are bringing the state of nations closer to the true Hobbesian state of nature. See, also, David P. Gauthier, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 207. As with Hobbes, Pufendorf argues that the state of nations is not quite as intolerable as the state of nature between individuals. The state of nations, reasons Pufendorf, “lacks those inconveniences which are attendant upon a pure state of nature....” And similarly, Spinoza suggests “that a commonwealth can guard itself against being subjugated by another, as a man in the state of nature cannot do.” See, A.G. Wernham, ed., , iii, II (Clarendon Press, 1958), p. 295. See For much earlier original writings by this author on the prospective impact of a Palestinian state on Israeli nuclear deterrence, see: Louis René Beres, “Security Threats and Effective Remedies: Israel’s Strategic, Tactical and Legal Options,” Ariel Center for Policy Research (Israel), ACPR Policy Paper No. 102, April 2000, 110 pp; Louis René Beres, “After the `Peace Process:’ Israel, Palestine, and Regional Nuclear War,” DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Vol. 15, No. 2., Winter 1997, pp. 301-335; Louis René Beres, “Limits of Nuclear Deterrence: The Strategic Risks and Dangers to Israel of False Hope,” ARMED FORCES AND SOCIETY, Vol. 23., No. 4., Summer 1997, pp. 539-568; Louis René Beres, “Getting Beyond Nuclear Deterrence: Israel, Intelligence and False Hope,” INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, Vol. 10., No. 1., Spring 1997, pp. 75-90; Louis René Beres, “On Living in a Bad Neighborhood: The Informed Argument for Israeli Nuclear Weapons,” POLITICAL CROSSROADS, Vol. 5., Nos. 1/2, 1997, pp. 143-157; Louis René Beres, “Facing the Apocalypse: Israel and the `Peace Process,’” BTZEDEK: THE JOURNAL OF RESPONSIBLE JEWISH COMMENTARY (Israel), Vol. 1., No. 3., Fall/Winter 1997, pp. 32-35; Louis René Beres and (Ambassador) Zalman Shoval, “Why Golan Demilitarization Would Not Work,” STRATEGIC REVIEW, Vol. XXIV, No. 1., Winter 1996, pp. 75-76; Louis René Beres, “Implications of a Palestinian State for Israeli Security and Nuclear War: A Jurisprudential Assessment,” DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Vol. 17., No. 2., 1999, pp. 229-286; Louis René Beres, “A Palestinian State and Israel’s Nuclear Strategy,” CROSSROADS: AN INTERNATIONAL SOCIO-POLITICAL JOURNAL, No. 31, 1991, pp. 97-104; Louis René Beres, “The Question of Palestine and Israel’s Nuclear Strategy,” THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY, Vol. 62, No. 4., October-December 1991, pp. 451-460; Louis René Beres, “Israel, Palestine and Regional Nuclear War,” BULLETIN OF PEACE PROPOSALS, Vol. 22., No. 2., June 1991, pp. 227-234; Louis René Beres, “A Palestinian State: Implications for Israel’s Security and the Possibility of Nuclear War,” BULLETIN OF THE JERUSALEM INSTITUTE FOR WESTERN DEFENCE (Israel), Vol. 4., Bulletin No, 3., October 1991, pp. 3-10; Louis René Beres, ISRAELI SECURITY AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS, PSIS Occasional Papers, No. 1/1990, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, Switzerland, 40 pp; and Louis René Beres, “After the Gulf War: Israel, Palestine and the Risk of Nuclear War in the Middle East,” STRATEGIC REVIEW, Vol. XIX, No. 4., Fall 1991, pp. 48-55. Contending Palestinian authorities still remain unable to meet variously codified expectations of statehood identified at the 1934 . This “Montevideo Convention” is the treaty governing statehood in all applicable international law. Jurisprudentially, Palestine still remains a “Non-Member Observer State.” The argument that a Palestinian state would be more benign because it could be “demilitarized” is unsupportable in strategic, political or jurisprudential terms. See, by this writer, Louis René Beres, “Why the Allen Plan and Palestinian Demilitarization Could Never Protect Israel,” 16 July, 2017. Earlier law journal articles on this limitation, co-authored with former Israeli Ambassador to the United States Zalman Shoval, include: Louis René Beres and Zalman Shoval, “Why a Demilitarized Palestinian State Would not Remain Demilitarized: A View Under International Law,” Winter 1998, pp. 347-363; and Louis René Beres and Zalman Shoval, “On Demilitarizing a Palestinian `Entity’ and the Golan Heights: An International Law Perspective,” , Vol. 28, No.5., 1995m pp. 959-972. The modern philosophic origins of “will” are discoverable in the writings of Arthur Schopenhauer, especially (1818). For his own inspiration, Schopenhauer drew upon Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. Later, Friedrich Nietzsche drew just as importantly upon Arthur Schopenhauer. Goethe was also a core intellectual source for Spanish existentialist Jose Ortega y’Gasset, author of the singularly prophetic twentieth-century work, ( ;1930). See, accordingly, Ortega’s very grand essay, “In Search of Goethe from Within” (1932), written for of Berlin on the centenary of Goethe’s death. It is reprinted in Ortega’s anthology, (1948) and is available from Princeton University Press (1968). “I believe,” says Oswald Spengler in his magisterial (1918), “is the one great word against metaphysical fear.” “Military doctrine” is not the same as “military strategy.” Doctrine “sets the stage” for strategy. It identifies various central beliefs that must subsequently animate any actual “order of battle.” Among other things, describes underlying general principles on how a particular war ought to be waged. The reciprocal task for is to adapt as required in order to best support previously-fashioned military doctrine. In world politics, says philosopher Alfred North Whitehead, any deeply-felt promise of immortality must be of “transcendent importance.” See his 1927. In the nineteenth century, in his posthumously published lecture on Politics (1896), German historian Heinrich von Treitschke observed: “Individual man sees in his own country the realization of his earthly immortality.” Earlier, German philosopher Georg Friedrich Hegel opined, in his (1820), that the state represents “the march of God in the world.” The “deification” of a transformation from mere principle of action to a sacred end in itself, drew its originating strength from the doctrine of sovereignty advanced in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Initially conceived as a principle of internal order, this doctrine underwent a specific metamorphosis, whence it became the formal or justifying rationale for international anarchy – that is, for the global “state of nature.” First established by Jean Bodin as a juristic concept in (1576), sovereignty came to be regarded as a power absolute and above the law. Understood in terms of modern international relations, this doctrine encouraged the notion that states lie above and beyond any form of legal regulation in their interactions with each other. At the same time, strategists cannot be allowed to forget, that theoretical fruitfulness must be achieved at some more-or-less tangible costs of “dehumanization.” Accordingly, Goethe reminds in , the original fragment: “All theory, dear friend, is grey, And the golden tree of life is green.” Translated by Professor Beres from the German: In the words of Jose Ortega y’Gasset: “Science, by which I mean the entire body of knowledge about things, whether corporeal or spiritual, is as much a work of imagination as it is of observation.... The latter is not possible without the former.” ( 1958). This does not mean trying to account for absolutely every pertinent explanatory variable. Clarifications can be found at “Occam’s Razor” or the “principle of parsimony.” This stipulates preference for the simplest explanation still consistent with scientific method. Regarding current concerns for Israel’s nuclear strategy, it suggests, , that the country’s military planners not seek to identify and examine every seemingly important variable, but rather to “say the most, with the least.” This presents an important and often neglected cautionary, because all too often, policy-makers and planners mistakenly attempt to be too inclusive. This attempt unwittingly distracts them from forging more efficient and “parsimonious” strategic theories. See: RESOLUTION ON THE DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION, Dec. 14, 1974, U.N.G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631, 1975, 13 I.L.M. 710, 1974; and CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, Art. 51. Done at San Francisco, June 26, 1945. Entered into force for the United States, Oct. 24, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993, Bevans 1153, 1976, Y.B.U.N. 1043 See by this author at BESA (Israel), Louis René Beres. For a coherent and comprehensive summation, see recent by Yaakov Lapin. World court established at The Hague On December 13, 1920, the League of Nations Assembly, sitting in Geneva, approved the statute setting up the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague.Learn more about the . Visit the website of the Permanent Court's successor body, the . President Wilson arrives in France to negotiate WWI treaty On December 13, 1918, President Woodrow Wilson arrived in France to negotiate a treaty to conclude World War I. Wilson was the first US President to visit Europe while in office. His meeting with the other Allied leaders would result in the , which created the League of Nations and redrew borders across Europe. 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Teenage West Ham goalkeeper dies aged 15 after cancer battle

No. 13 seed Tarleton State wins inaugural FCS playoff game, beats Drake 43-29Fianna Fail leader Micheal Martin said it “remains to be seen” whether he will be the next Taoiseach, as he predicted an outperformance of an exit poll which placed his party closely trailing in third. Mr Martin was comfortably elected on the first count after topping the poll in the Cork South Central constituency, and was hoisted into the air by his sons Cillian and Micheal Aodh. The exit poll put his party on 19.5%, behind its Civil War rival-turned coalition partner Fine Gael at 21%, and the largest opposition party Sinn Fein at 21.1%. Speaking immediately after his election, a jubilant Mr Martin predicted: “It transpires that we’ll probably exceed that exit poll prediction above the margin of error [of 1.4%] – we could be looking at 21.9% now.” He said the day following the poll had been a “rollercoaster”, reflecting that the party had been “left wondering ‘where were we?'” after the exit poll. Asked about that possibility he would become Taoiseach as the leader of the largest party in the next coalition, he told reporters he was now awaiting the national results – which could take days to finalise. He added: “That remains to be seen, obviously, in terms of the results the length and breadth of the country.” He further warned that the election remains “extraordinarily competitive” and added: “There’s going to be a lot of twists and turns.” Mr Martin thanked the people of Cork South Central for re-electing him, adding that he feels a “huge sense of responsibility”. “I will also be grateful to them for enabling me to have the honour of representing them in Dail Eireann – that is my first task, a representative of Cork South Central and advance the interests of Cork more generally.” He also thanked his family, saying: “I want to thank my wife Mary who really worked night and day when I was around the country, leading the campaign with Micheal Aodh and Aoibhe and Cillian.” Speculation has begun on what parties or independents may join with Fianna Fail – and Fine Gael – in a future coalition. Both those parties have ruled out a coalition with Sinn Fein. Turning to that process of government formation, he said he would like to see that happen faster than in 2020 – when it took several months. That process resulted in Fianna Fail and Fine Gael, two parties forged from opposing sides of Ireland’s Civil War of the 1920s, agreeing to set aside almost a century of animosity and share power. The Greens joined as a junior partner, but early indications showed the party could be facing an electoral wipeout. Mr Martin said: The Greens, to their credit, didn’t buckle over the four and a half years. “Being in government can be difficult for any political party. “It is to the credit of the Greens that they went into government. We had challenges, we had different priorities of three political parties, but this government went full term, and I think Ireland was for the better for that.” Taking the previous formation talks into consideration, Mr Martin predicted the future will involve very difficult negotiations between parties: “It will be challenging. This is not easy.” He said there has to be “real clarity” around a programme for government before forming a coalition. Asked how important it is to form a government before the inauguration of US President-elect Donald Trump, Mr Martin said: “I think we have to... to be honest with you, in the best interests of Ireland in the first instance.” Fianna Fail had campaigned on a message of stable financial management in the face of potential economic shocks caused by policy decisions from the next US administration. Asked why he felt Fianna Fail was underestimated in the polls, he said: “Look, I’m not going to go on about polls but I would have had a better evening last night if they had been more accurate.” He added: “I mean the polls give Fianna Fail heart attacks all the time.”

How much superannuation do I need to retire in Australia?No. 13 seed Tarleton State wins inaugural FCS playoff game, beats Drake 43-29

Ruben Amorim urges Man Utd to ‘run like mad dogs’ in bid to turn season round

Teenage West Ham goalkeeper dies aged 15 after cancer battleFrom left, Jerry Dyer, welder and artist Jeramy Anderson and Trillium’s Bryan Voytilla pose with a new statue built by Anderson to commemorate Floway’s 90th anniversary. The statue will be displayed in the company’s lobby. Photos by Gabriel Dillard There aren’t many businesses in Fresno that can lay claim to being 90 years old, founded the same year Bonnie and Clyde were killed by police and Babe Ruth hit his 700 home run and left the Yankees. The Floway brand of vertical turbine pumps has been part of Fresno’s farm irrigation landscape since 1934 — a milestone marked this week by parent company Trillium Flow Technologies with ceremony and even sculpture. Fresno Mayor Jerry Dyer and Blake Konczal, executive director of the Fresno Regional Workforce Development Board, were among the guests at a ceremony Tuesday at Floway’s south Fresno facility. Also present were Bryan Voytilla, managing director for Trillium’s American pumps division and Stephen Avila, plant manager. Since 2019, when Houston-based Trillium acquired Weir Flow Control, the manufacturing operation has nearly doubled in size to 231 people with a recently expanded facility featuring an additional 13,000 square feet of space. That growth — and the impact of jobs one can raise a family on — was not lost on Dyer, who commended the enterprise for its longevity. With production stopped for the ceremony, Dyer addressed the hard work of the Floway team. “A company cannot achieve this level of success without dedicated employees,” Dyer said. Floway has also evolved in its time, transitioning to make armaments for the allies in World War II. It has also expanded into the municipal, mining and military fueling sectors. Dyer thanked the Floway team for its commitment to Fresno. “Too many companies today are pulling up roots and moving to greener pastures,” Dyer said. “I like to think the greenest pasture is here in Fresno.” With global headquarters in Glasgow, Scotland, Trillium celebrated the 90 anniversary with a tradition that actually started in their plant in Italy — commissioning sculptures made from pump parts by local artists. Jeramy Anderson, a local welder, artist and instructor, was commissioned to make a sculpture to celebrate Floway’s anniversary. His 7-foot piece is meant to evoke water traveling vertically in a helix, pushed up a column by an actual Trillium impeller. Konczal, whose job is helping to train workers for jobs the region’s employers need to fill, said companies like Trillium help make sure roads are maintained and public safety services are available in Fresno. “Companies like Trillium are the types of companies that provide the tax base to have a nice city,” Konczal said. Fresno Mayor Jerry Dyer announced Thursday that the city has There aren’t many businesses in Fresno that can lay claim The Nov. 29 print edition of The Business Journal included A national staffing firm based in Fresno is hosting a

Florida Surgeon General Ladapo urges communities to stop fluoridating their waterFrom Raygun to Rinehart: 25 predictions for 2025Fianna Fail leader Micheal Martin said it “remains to be seen” whether he will be the next Taoiseach, as he predicted an outperformance of an exit poll which placed his party closely trailing in third. Mr Martin was comfortably elected on the first count after topping the poll in the Cork South Central constituency, and was hoisted into the air by his sons Cillian and Micheal Aodh. The exit poll put his party on 19.5%, behind its Civil War rival-turned coalition partner Fine Gael at 21%, and the largest opposition party Sinn Fein at 21.1%. Speaking immediately after his election, a jubilant Mr Martin predicted: “It transpires that we’ll probably exceed that exit poll prediction above the margin of error [of 1.4%] – we could be looking at 21.9% now.” He said the day following the poll had been a “rollercoaster”, reflecting that the party had been “left wondering ‘where were we?'” after the exit poll. Asked about that possibility he would become Taoiseach as the leader of the largest party in the next coalition, he told reporters he was now awaiting the national results – which could take days to finalise. He added: “That remains to be seen, obviously, in terms of the results the length and breadth of the country.” He further warned that the election remains “extraordinarily competitive” and added: “There’s going to be a lot of twists and turns.” Mr Martin thanked the people of Cork South Central for re-electing him, adding that he feels a “huge sense of responsibility”. “I will also be grateful to them for enabling me to have the honour of representing them in Dail Eireann – that is my first task, a representative of Cork South Central and advance the interests of Cork more generally.” He also thanked his family, saying: “I want to thank my wife Mary who really worked night and day when I was around the country, leading the campaign with Micheal Aodh and Aoibhe and Cillian.” Speculation has begun on what parties or independents may join with Fianna Fail – and Fine Gael – in a future coalition. Both those parties have ruled out a coalition with Sinn Fein. Turning to that process of government formation, he said he would like to see that happen faster than in 2020 – when it took several months. That process resulted in Fianna Fail and Fine Gael, two parties forged from opposing sides of Ireland’s Civil War of the 1920s, agreeing to set aside almost a century of animosity and share power. The Greens joined as a junior partner, but early indications showed the party could be facing an electoral wipeout. Mr Martin said: The Greens, to their credit, didn’t buckle over the four and a half years. “Being in government can be difficult for any political party. “It is to the credit of the Greens that they went into government. We had challenges, we had different priorities of three political parties, but this government went full term, and I think Ireland was for the better for that.” Taking the previous formation talks into consideration, Mr Martin predicted the future will involve very difficult negotiations between parties: “It will be challenging. This is not easy.” He said there has to be “real clarity” around a programme for government before forming a coalition. Asked how important it is to form a government before the inauguration of US President-elect Donald Trump, Mr Martin said: “I think we have to... to be honest with you, in the best interests of Ireland in the first instance.” Fianna Fail had campaigned on a message of stable financial management in the face of potential economic shocks caused by policy decisions from the next US administration. Asked why he felt Fianna Fail was underestimated in the polls, he said: “Look, I’m not going to go on about polls but I would have had a better evening last night if they had been more accurate.” He added: “I mean the polls give Fianna Fail heart attacks all the time.”

IOWA CITY — Jahmal Banks let out a deep breath that would have been visible a few minutes earlier on the Kinnick Stadium field as the pom-pom atop his red stocking cap bobbed. What’s left? The Nebraska senior receiver hadn’t really considered it yet. His spirits — not to mention body temperature — were too down in the moments after another walk-off loss to Iowa. Regular season over, with this fifth defeat in six games stinging more as the numbness began to wear off. “Get better,” Banks said finally. “Craft. At the end of the day, it’s still football. For the people who are going to be with us, we’ll give everything we have. And just keep going.” The day after the Iowa game has been Blacker Saturday for Nebraska for most of the last decade. It usually marks the end of games and the beginning of an offseason of reflection and roster change while other teams play in December and January. People are also reading... These Huskers will be busier. Early signing day moved up even earlier this cycle from mid-December to Wednesday and NU — at 19 known commits into the weekend and potential targets still in the balance — will try to close better than it did in Iowa City. The transfer portal opens Dec. 9 and coach Matt Rhule has said he expects upwards of 50 players to enter as the program begins to trim its roster from 150-plus on the way to next year’s mandated maximum size of 105. Of course, Nebraska will be an active shopper in the free-agent market, too. Nebraska's Dylan Raiola runs with the ball against Iowa on Friday at Kinnick Stadium in Iowa City. Unlike the past seven seasons, though, bowl season will also include a Nebraska bowl game. A year ago the matchups for possible bowls the Huskers are contenders for now — including the Music City, Guaranteed Rate, Pinstripe, GameAbove Sports and Duke’s Mayo — were announced the Sunday after conference championship weekend. That gives NU a full week to chew on yet another one-score loss before it has an opponent for which to prepare. While a crowd of Iowa players reveled in boisterous extended postgame interviews, only a few Huskers spoke. Those brief sessions — for just a few minutes each as the team hurried to pack up and return to Lincoln — were more about the future than the painful immediate past. Quarterback Dylan Raiola — like his new offensive coordinator, Dana Holgorsen — said he knew he would take at least a day or two off. “I’m not really sure what’s going to happen next, what bowl we’re going to or what’s going on,” the freshman said. “We’ll figure that out soon.” Senior defensive lineman Ty Robinson wore a straight face as he considered that his sixth and final college season would last longer than any of the others. Even with a likely NFL future coming, don’t count him as part of the modern trend of postseason opt-outs “Come back on Monday,” Robinson said. “It’s new for me so I don’t really know what to expect. I’m excited to be a part of it, though. I love this program. I love that I get to be able to practice and play football for the next few weeks and get to go to a bowl game.” Rhule — as angry as he was upset late Friday — said the Iowa result should “probably bother people” for a while. It should fester with younger players who will be back in red inside Kinnick Stadium in 2026. At some point, he said, Nebraska needs to finish. Chasing three points was the program’s season-long motto and ultimately the Hawkeyes were the ones who caught the triple. “It’s just where we’re at, you know what I mean?” Rhule said. “As dumb as that sounds, we have to get better. Have to get better.” Nebraska has objectively improved in areas from the beginning of the year. The defense was dominant save for one disastrous sequence on the 72-yard touchdown that began with a swing pass to Iowa running back Kaleb Johnson and included five missed tackles. The offense under Holgorsen moved and controlled the ball. But the shortcomings were on display, too. The Huskers forced no takeaways for a second time in November. Too many potential big plays on offense went unmade or unseen. Special teams featured another catastrophic moment on the muffed punt and a series of lesser miscues that consistently tilted field position toward the Hawkeyes. Friday wasn’t the season finale this time. Even it felt like it in the cold. “Losing this game doesn’t do justice to see all the success and the strides we’ve made as a team,” Raiola said. “But that’s what it is right now.” Photos: Nebraska football vs. Iowa on Black Friday — Nov. 29 Nebraska players, including Jacob Hood (center), turn to wave during the "Hawkeye Wave" on Friday in Iowa City. Nebraska assistant coach Garret McGuire looks on during warm up before the Iowa game, Friday, Nov. 29, 2024, at Kinnick Stadium in Iowa City, Iowa. Nebraska assistant coach Marcus Satterfield looks on during warm up before the Iowa game, Friday, Nov. 29, 2024, at Kinnick Stadium in Iowa City, Iowa. Nebraska fan Zachary Roth of Omaha dances in the cold during the Iowa game, Friday, Nov. 29, 2024, at Kinnick Stadium in Iowa City, Iowa. Nebraska head coach Matt Rhule talks with an official during the Iowa game on Friday at Kinnick Stadium in Iowa City. Nebraska's Jahmal Banks is tackled by Iowa's TJ Hall on Friday at Kinnick Stadium in Iowa City. Iowa's Kamari Moulton (center) is tackled by Nebraska's MJ Sherman (left) and Elijah Jeudy, Friday, Nov. 29, 2024, at Kinnick Stadium in Iowa City, Iowa. Nebraska's Carter Nelson (center) is tackled by Iowa's Deontae Craig (right) on Friday at Kinnick Stadium in Iowa City. Iowa's Quinn Schulte (left) tackles Nebraska's Nate Boerkircher, Friday, Nov. 29, 2024, at Kinnick Stadium in Iowa City, Iowa. Nebraska's Thomas Fidone picks up a pass against Iowa, Friday, Nov. 29, 2024, at Kinnick Stadium in Iowa City, Iowa. Nebraska's John Hohl reacts after missing a field goal against Iowa, Friday, Nov. 29, 2024, at Kinnick Stadium in Iowa City, Iowa. Nebraska's Dylan Raiola runs with the ball against Iowa on Friday at Kinnick Stadium in Iowa City. Nebraska's Isaac Gifford (left) rips the ball away from Iowa's Jarriett Buie on Friday at Kinnick Stadium in Iowa City. The Nebraska defense stops Iowa on fourth down on Friday at Kinnick Stadium in Iowa City. Nebraska's Jahmal Banks picks up a pass next to Iowa's Deshaun Lee, Friday, Nov. 29, 2024, at Kinnick Stadium in Iowa City, Iowa. Nebraska's Emmett Johnson escapes a tackle by Iowa's Deshaun Lee, Friday, Nov. 29, 2024, at Kinnick Stadium in Iowa City, Iowa. Nebraska head coach Matt Rhule looks on during the Iowa game, Friday, Nov. 29, 2024, at Kinnick Stadium in Iowa City, Iowa. Nebraska's Dante Dowdell tries to break a tackle from Iowa's Jay Higgins (left) and Koen Entringer (4), Friday, Nov. 29, 2024, at Kinnick Stadium in Iowa City, Iowa. Nebraska's Emmett Johnson fumbles under pressure from Iowa's Sebastian Castro (top) and TJ Hall (bottom), Friday, Nov. 29, 2024, at Kinnick Stadium in Iowa City, Iowa. Iowa's Drew Stevens (18) celebrates after making the game-winning kick against Nebraska, Friday, Nov. 29, 2024, at Kinnick Stadium in Iowa City, Iowa. Iowa's Drew Stevens (18) celebrates after making the game-winning kick against Nebraska, Friday, Nov. 29, 2024, at Kinnick Stadium in Iowa City, Iowa. Iowa's Luke Elkin (left) and Ty Nissen carry Heroes Game trophy after defeating Nebraska on Friday at Kinnick Stadium in Iowa City. Iowa's Drew Stevens (18) kicks a game-winning field goal through the arms of Nebraska's Ty Robinson (9) and Nash Hutmacher (0) on Friday at Kinnick Stadium in Iowa City. Nebraska's Dante Dowdell scores a touchdown against Iowa in the second quarter, Friday, Nov. 29, 2024, at Kinnick Stadium in Iowa City, Iowa. Nebraska's Dylan Raiola carries the ball against Iowa, Friday, Nov. 29, 2024, at Kinnick Stadium in Iowa City, Iowa. Iowa's Deontae Craig (bottom) pressures Nebraska's Dylan Raiola, Friday, Nov. 29, 2024, at Kinnick Stadium in Iowa City, Iowa. Nebraska's John Hohl (right) celebrates his field goal against Iowa, Friday, Nov. 29, 2024, at Kinnick Stadium in Iowa City, Iowa. Nebraska's Mikai Gbayor tips a pass by Iowa's Jackson Stratton on Friday at Kinnick Stadium in Iowa City. Iowa's Deontae Craig (left) and Aaron Graves (right) pressure Nebraska's Dylan Raiola on at Kinnick Stadium in Iowa City, Iowa. Nebraska head coach Matt Rhule (left) talks with Iowa head coach Kirk Ferentz before the game, Friday, Nov. 29, 2024, at Kinnick Stadium in Iowa City, Iowa. Jesse Divis of David City, 17, braves the cold before the Nebraska game at Iowa, Friday, Nov. 29, 2024, at Kinnick Stadium in Iowa City, Iowa. Nebraska head coach Matt Rhule arrives before the Iowa game, Friday, Nov. 29, 2024, at Kinnick Stadium in Iowa City, Iowa. Nebraska special teams coordinator Ed Foley arrives before the Iowa game, Friday, Nov. 29, 2024, at Kinnick Stadium in Iowa City, Iowa. Nebraska's Dylan Raiola arrives before the Iowa game, Friday, Nov. 29, 2024, at Kinnick Stadium in Iowa City, Iowa. The Nebraska football team arrives arrives at Kinnick Stadium before the Iowa game, Friday, Nov. 29, 2024, in Iowa City, Iowa. The Nebraska football team arrives arrives at Kinnick Stadium before the Iowa game, Friday, Nov. 29, 2024, in Iowa City, Iowa. Nebraska offensive coordinator Dana Holgorsen arrives at Kinnick Stadium before the Iowa game, Friday, Nov. 29, 2024, in Iowa City, Iowa. Subscribe for the best Husker news & commentary Be the first to know Get local news delivered to your inbox!